Iranian Nexus: How Sectarianism furthers Tehran’s Grand Strategy
Tehran has spent decades building relationships that could turn the entire Middle East into a battleground.
The Singapore-flagged Norman Atlantic in the Strait of Hormuz after an Iranian attack in the 1987 Tanker War. Just one of many scenarios that could occur in the event of a broader escalation today. Source
At any hour of any day, on land or at sea, and in practically any location across the Middle East, the interests of the United States and its allies are under threat like never before. A destroyed oil field, troops killed while sleeping in their barracks, or even a whole aircraft carrier sunk – these are just some of the nightmare scenarios faced by the United States and its allies as a result of Iran’s grand strategy of regional anti-access area denial (A2AD) should an all-out war ensue. This strategy has been developed over decades and relies heavily on proxies formed out of the rubble of shattered states across the region and sectarian divisions underpinning the societies within them for centuries.
In this article, we explore how Iran and its proxies exert an outsized influence across the Middle East and the implications of what this means as tensions between these groups and US forces continue to mount throughout the region.
Tehran harnesses Shia groups to extend influence far beyond its borders
Although Shia communities are a minority in the Arab world, Iranian-backed Shia militias exert outsized influence across the Middle East.
In Lebanon, Iran-backed Hezbollah reportedly has more firepower at its disposal than 95% of the world’s conventional militaries. Borne out of southern Lebanon’s Shia community during the country’s brutal civil war of the 1980s and aided extensively by Iranian patronage ever since the group now possesses the means to inflict severe damage to critical infrastructure across Israel and beyond. With the conflict between Hezbollah and the Jewish state intensifying in recent months, Hezbollah is the crucial factor as to whether the current regional war will escalate moving forward. Moreover, Hezbollah operatives can be found throughout the region, helping other Iran-aligned groups militarily and logistically. These activities have been fueled in part by the group’s global crime network, which generates vast sums of cash each year used to solidify its control over much of Lebanon and shield it from the sweeping sanctions placed upon it by Washington. Some estimates put Hezbollah’s total fighting force at over 100,000 individuals.
Tehran wields so much influence over Iraq that an article in Time Magazine last March was titled “How Iran Won the Iraq War.” Iran currently has ties to over a dozen political parties represented in Iraq: these form the Shi’a Coalition Framework (CF), which governs the country nationally and recently gained a plurality of seats in the December 18 provincial elections. Perhaps more importantly, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) – an umbrella organization for multiple Iran-backed Shi’a militant groups – has become the most potent paramilitary force in the country. Closely aligned with the ruling CF, the PMF has gained access to Iraq’s state budget and enjoys extensive legal protections without any of the responsibilities associated with submission to the state: this allows them to dually serve the interests of the Iran-backed government of Baghdad as well as those of Tehran itself. The number of reported personnel under the PMF banner has grown substantially as of late: a report issued by the Iraqi parliamentary Finance Committee stated that the PMF’s total fighting force increased by 95% to 238,000 in 2023.
Syria’s Iran-backed Shi’ite militias gained global prominence on January 28 when one of these groups targeted and killed three US service members at the Tower 22 outpost near the Jordanian border using a one-way attack drone. Since descending into civil war in 2011, the regime of Bashar al-Assad has become increasingly reliant on Tehran for providing internal security. While the war was at its most intense, Iran recruited heavily from abroad and locally to form armed militias, drawing heavily from the local Shia minority and paying attractive salaries to fighters from its coffers. With the security situation having improved since 2017, Tehran has focused on infiltrating Syrian society by co-opting local business figures and forming private security companies, ostensibly to protect their interests. Estimates claim that Syria is home to at least 60,000 operatives from Iranian-backed militias.
In Yemen, Iranian-backed Houthis have gained global attention in recent months for their ability to disrupt shipping traffic on the Red Sea, one of the world’s most important waterways. Before that, the group fought against the forces of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States in a lengthy civil war that has ultimately brought them much closer to Tehran. Originating out of a Yemeni Shia minority that comprises some 35% of the Yemeni populace, the Houthis now control territory that is home to as much as 80% of the country’s population, including the capital of Sana’a and key coastal areas that have allowed it to practically close off the Bab el-Mendeb Strait at the mouth of the Red Sea. Reports indicate the group maintains a fighting force of some 20,000 soldiers.
In Iraq, the line between the military and the state-sponsored paramilitary PMF forces (pictured) is not entirely clear. Source
Iran capitalized on Syria’s civil war to greatly extend its influence over the country. Source
Yemeni Houthis boarding a Israel-linked ship on the Red Sea. Source
Anti-access area denial: how sectarianism fuels Iran’s grand strategy
Tehran has excelled at co-opting Shi’a groups across the greater Middle East and incorporating these into its geopolitical strategy. Historical divisions between Sunni and Shi’a that date back centuries and include the Ottoman-Persian wars of the 16th century where the two sides engaged in massacres, deportations, and forced conversions in the name of religious sectarianism. Thanks in large part to the state failures of recent decades – brought about by factors such as foreign intervention, civil wars, and economic crises – Iran has once again been able to capitalize on these divisions for its own strategic advantage while arming these groups with its domestically-produced 21st century technologies.
Israeli intelligence reports that Iran is developing a one tonne missile with a range of up to 5,000 kilometers and the country is currently in possession of missiles with a range of 2,000 kilometers. In 2022, Tehran unveiled the latest version of its Mohajer attack drone, which resembles the American MQ-9 Reaper and is capable of striking Israel from a takeoff locations inside Iran. Although these technologies have not been transferred to Iran’s proxies, they underline Tehran’s vast defence capabilities. Instead, Iranian proxies across the Middle East are heavily armed with low-cost and low-tech weapons capable of striking a vast array of targets in the region such as the Shahed 131 and 136 drones. These units cost as little as $20,000 each and went completely undetected by US forces in Jordan when one was used to strike Tower 22 last month. Tehran has also been outsourcing missile production to its proxies since at least 2014: in one example, Hezbollah was found to be producing its own precision-guided missiles at a factory run by a site manager who visited Iran regularly in 2020.
With ranges of hundreds or even thousands of kilometers, these missiles and drones can be used to strike a wide range of targets with relative ease and anonymity. In the hands of Iranian-backed militias, they fit into Tehran’s strategy of anti-access area denial (A2AD). As mentioned in my previous article, an A2AD strategy seeks to inflict maximal damage to an opposing force and thereby limit its ability to maneuver throughout a region. It allows critical damage to be inflicted on a wide variety of military targets such as bases and aircraft carriers, civilian targets such as other the infrastructure of other countries, and foreign investments such as energy extraction operations in Iraq and the Persian Gulf. In the event of a full escalation, practically everything in the region associated with Iran’s enemies would become a target, leaving no one area safe: this is the essence of A2AD. The number of casualties under such as scenario would be staggering and so too would the impact on global energy prices: as such, practically every corner of the planet would feel the consequences in one way or another.
Tehran’s apparent lack of control over its aligned groups makes this strategy all the more dangerous. In recent weeks, Iranian officials have urged their proxies to exercise restraint following multiple attacks on US forces. Although this has resulted in an unusual lull in violent incidents from these groups, it nonetheless indicates that Tehran is not entirely calling the shots with regard to their actions. Examples of when these proxies have disregarded Tehran’s advice include the Houthis’ 2014 capture of Sana’a, or the fact that some PMF groups in Iraq have continued to attack US forces despite Tehran’s calls for restraint. Given the series of challenges that threaten Iran’s own internal stability and the power of its regime, these armed groups could become even more volatile in the coming years, potentially posing a regional threat even in the absence of Iranian patronage.
Iran and its proxies hold sway over much of the Middle East and can hit targets throughout the region. Source
Conclusion
By capitalizing on the systemic breakdown of order across much of the Middle East, Iran has weaponized centuries of sectarian divisions across the region to form a grand strategy that threatens the interests of the United States and its allies there. Decades of isolation and antagonization by the United States have made Tehran and its proxies particularly well-suited to asymmetrical warfare. If this is put to the test, the consequences could be severe and global in scope. For this reason, factors such as further attacks on US troops in the region, tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, and the situation in the Red Sea should be monitored closely moving forward.
Excellent piece. It helped me organize what I had previously heard in a coherent manner. I also learned that Hezbollah and Iran are a helluva lot more powerful than I realized. I almost have the impression Iran has applied a conventional military industrial complex approach with a symmetrical warfare strategy. Perhaps a topic for another piece?
In terms of writing, the content is clear, the length appropriate for the purpose of the piece, and it avoids the tangents à la NYT. I don’t mind at all that there are no original quotes as I don’t find it necessary to convey this type of information. What I need is accuracy and relative unbiasedness (I.e., I know this is biased in the US favour, but that’s OK as it’s clear), which this piece has.
Minor note as you are scaling operations: you might want to use Grammarly or similar before publishing to catch typos.